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E xplicit formal mechanisms dominate the discussion about incentives in Operations Management, yet many othermechanisms exist. Social comparison between peers may provide strong implicit incentives for individuals. Social
comparison arises naturally in all social settings and may thus be unintended; however, many companies deliberately use
it to motivate employees. In this study, we model a social context in which purchasers evaluate their performance relative
to their peers; a feeling of inferiority results in a negative contribution to utility, whereas a feeling of superiority results in
a positive contribution. We find that social comparison induces characteristic deviations from the newsvendor optimum
ordering decision: if fear of inferiority outweighs anticipation of superiority, then purchasers herd together; the converse
scenario incites actors to polarize away from each other. In both cases, actors will deviate from ordering the newsvendor
optimum in order to satisfy social goals. Demand correlation and profit margins moderate the extent of the deviation.
Key words: purchasing; organizing purchasing; newsvendor; social comparison
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1. Introduction and Literature Review
Incentive theory, especially the theory of mechanism
design, has become synonymous in Operations
Management with the settings of adverse selection
and moral hazard. A key characteristic of both—the
immediate transfer of utility from the firm to its
employees in exchange for a given level of output,
often conceptualized as a transfer of money—has
been criticized as impractical in many situations (e.g.,
Fehr and Falk 2002). Live organizations consciously
or inadvertently use many alternative mechanisms to
influence human behavior. In this study, we focus on
the impact of social comparison on purchasing. Social
comparison between peers provides strong implicit
incentives for individuals, and it is omnipresent in
virtually all organizations. We study the purchasing
decisions of purchasing managers who operate in a
corporate context while surrounded by and compared
with people inside their organization. In addition to
caring about their own performance, these managers
take into account their performance relative to peers.
Our work on incentives is distinct from what many
Operations Management scholars have come to
associate with the concept. Economists have estab-
lished an extensive theoretical methodology for pro-
viding incentives to individuals that addresses
private information, private actions, and non-
verifiability (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In its
diverse instantiations, this methodology has focused
on transfers of utility from the firm to the agent in
exchange for favorable behavior by the agent. In the-
ory such transfers can take on many forms, but in
practice they are best viewed as transfers of money;
only such transfers allow for the fine-grained differen-
tiation between rewards for different levels of agent
output that the mechanisms require. These mecha-
nisms are intricate and therefore not easy to apply.
Moreover, they may not be cost effective, especially
given that, at the lower levels of a hierarchy the influ-
ence of an individual contributor on the firm’s mea-
surable output is limited. Group responsibilities
prevail. So even though the insights from this incen-
tive theory have extended our theoretical and practi-
cal understanding of some organizational situations,
they describe only part of what motivates people in
real-world organizations. Alternative mechanisms,
such as the creation of a (competitive) culture and
promotion schemes, also provide direct and indirect
incentives. Such alternative methods often prove to be
more practical.
Social comparison is a natural tendency in human
beings (Suls et al. 2002). Many settings in which
humans interact are affected by social comparison; it
arises spontaneously. However, the concept is
important to managers because many management
practices, explicitly or implicitly, either emphasize or
deemphasize social comparison. Organizations may
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emphasize comparison deliberately, to provide incen-
tives, or unconsciously, sometimes to the detriment of
organizational performance.
Starting with Festinger’s (1954) social comparison
theory, social psychologists have extensively studied
the tendency innate in most human beings to evaluate
one’s own personal well-being in comparison with a
relevant peer group. For example, Luttmer (2005)
shows that a person’s happiness depends strongly on
how she fares relative to her neighbors. Psychologists
have researched the implications of social comparison
as well as the mechanisms that drive it. Social com-
parison is closely related to self-evaluation (Wood
and Taylor 1991) and hence is related to the concept
of self (Salovey and Rodin 1991). It is connected to
self-esteem (Gibbons and McCoy 1991), it even factors
in depression (Gibbons 1986). Social comparison is a
strong motivator because most people seem naturally
to derive utility from comparing themselves to others.
These natural human tendencies are often har-
nessed by organizations. Explicit aspects of an organi-
zation’s motivational system may result in some
managers striving to outperform others. Competition
for status within an organization can strongly moti-
vate individuals to take into account the decisions and
outcomes realized by their peers (Sidanius and Pratto
1999). Systems that use job titles as tokens of social
status have been shown to influence performance
(Greenberg and Ornstein 1983). Public celebrations of
success—for instance, conspicuous celebrations of
individual sellers’ successes (and promotions) in mul-
tilevel marketing organizations—exploit the motiva-
tional forces in social settings (Huberman et al. 2004).
Often companies do foster social comparison less
consciously. The comparison embedded in many pay
systems provides strong motivation. For example,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show empirically that
workers’ efforts within an organization are to a large
extent determined by the comparison of their salary
to that of their co-workers. Siemsen et al. (2009) show
how psychological safety (and thus the potential loss
of status) influence knowledge sharing in a manufac-
turing context.
Whether social comparison arises naturally or
whether it is brought about (or extended) by manage-
ment systems, comparison leads to the same effect.
Whenever making a decision, the decision maker
evaluates not only the inherent aspects of that deci-
sion but also how it will affect her position with
respect to a reference group. So-called social utility
functions (Loewenstein et al. 1989), which encompass
not only outcomes for decision makers themselves
but also outcomes for other individuals, have been
widely studied in behavioral and experimental
economics (e.g., Camerer et al. 2003, Camerer and
Loewenstein 2004).
Social utility functions need to encompass both
punitive and rewarding settings. A rewarding situa-
tion arises, for example, when only one of a large set
of people can be rewarded (e.g., by promotion or a
special prize). For instance, often the person selected
to head a department comes from one of the sub-
groups of that department. The extent to which an
individual’s performance sticks out of a subgroup
then becomes a measure for the promotion probabil-
ity of that individual. An example of a punitive sys-
tem is the setting in which the lowest-performing
individuals in a department are routinely laid off (see,
e.g., the description of General Electric’s promotion
system in Welch and Welch 2005). The extent to
which an individual underperforms others in the
department becomes a measure for the probability of
being laid off. Hence, social comparison can engender
two effects. It can induce the joy of outperforming a
comparison group or the despair at being outper-
formed by a comparison group. Therefore, in our
model the purchasing managers not only optimize
expected profit under uncertainty but also weigh the
outcomes with respect to positive or negative compar-
ison within the organization.
Social comparison has an immediate relation to
counterfactual thinking, especially regret aversion
theory. The main concept in this theory is that an
agent’s decision making is influenced by her percep-
tion of what might have occurred had she made
different choices (Bell 1982, Loomes and Sugden 1982,
Mellers et al. 1997). Yet, because it is difficult ex post
to judge what might have been achievable ex ante,
managers’ perceptions of forgone opportunities may
lie more in the observable realizations of their peers
than in any hypothetical scenario. Thus managers
compare their achievements not with respect to an
internal frame of reference but rather against a salient
reminder of what they could have achieved: the per-
formance of their peers.1 For their obvious parallels
we call the ill-being that results from being outper-
formed social regret and the joy of outperforming
others social rejoice.
The behavioral operations management literature
has focused on understanding—by both theoretical
and empirical means—how preference structures and
decision biases of the isolated individual induce the
decision maker to deviate from risk neutral profit
maximization. Thus, the literature has developed an
understanding of risk aversion (Eeckhoudt et al.
1995), cognitive biases such as loss aversion (Wang
and Webster 2009) or prospect theory at large
(Schweitzer and Cachon 2000), learning (Bolton and
Katok 2008), and the faulty assessment of information
(Croson and Donohue 2006). Bounded rationality has
also been shown to explain many suboptimal ordering
patterns both analytically and empirically; see Su
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(2008) for a model and Kremer et al. (2010) for an
experimental test. There is limited work on how the
social setting influences supply chain decisions. Loch
and Wu (2008) establish experimentally the influence
of social status on supply chain relations and Cui et al.
(2007) examine how fairness considerations can imply
coordination even for constant wholesale prices in a
two-stage supply chain with deterministic demand.
In this study we analyze the newsvendor decision in
the context of social comparison. Our contribution is
twofold. First, we contribute to the academic literature
by showing the impact of the organizational environ-
ment on inventory decision making. Second, we con-
tribute to management practice by pointing out the
wanted or unwanted effects that social comparison may
induce in a purchasing department. We thus describe
how methods that affect social comparison may affect
behavior in a purchasing organization. Methods include
hard factors such as the aforementioned relative
monetary incentives and the success-based promotion
system, and soft factors such as customs and methods
used to regulate social status seeking.
2. Model
In the classic newsvendor framework, each decision
maker is interested exclusively in the profit resulting
from her own ordering decision. In contrast, model-
ing performance comparisons among purchasers
requires that we complement the utility function of
the classic newsvendor by incorporating aspects of
how the decision makers fare with respect to their
peer group. This complement has two components,
the extent to which the purchaser is superior to the
peer group (the social regret contribution) and the
extent to which she is inferior (the social rejoice con-
tribution). In order to build a parsimonious model,
we posit the peer group as a second player in a two-
player game.
Formally, purchaser i orders quantity qi at unit cost
c and of this quantity the purchaser can sell up to the
stochastic demand di at unit revenue p. In order to
prevent complexity from obscuring insights, we
assume that di follows a uniform distribution on the
interval [0,1].
In the case of being outperformed, purchaser
iweights her profit inferiority with c relative to the real-
ized non-social newsvendor profit piðqi; diÞ ¼ pmin
ðqi; diÞ  cqi. In the case of outperforming, purchaser
i weights her profit superiority with d relative to the
realized non-social newsvendor profit to form utility:
Uiðqi; qi; di; diÞ ¼ piðqi; diÞ
 c½piðqi; diÞ  piðqi; diÞþ
þ d½piðqi; diÞ  piðqi; diÞþ:
ð1Þ
We assume that c  0 and d  0 and c > 0 or
d > 0. Note that this assumption incorporates the
cases c = 0 and d > 0 as well as c > 0 and d = 0. We
assume that both newsvendors maximize their
expected utility Edi;di ½Ui and that both players set
their decisions simultaneously. Hence our model
describes a two-player, simultaneous move game
with common knowledge. For notational simplicity,
define qe1 and q
e
2 as the equilibrium quantities ordered
by the two players and q ¼ pcp as the non-social
newsvendor profit maximizing order quantity.
2.1. Social Regret Case
For c > d, the social regret component plays a larger
role than the social rejoice component. We call this
case the social regret case. In order to facilitate gaining
insight into the impact of demand correlation, we con-
sider analytically the cases of perfectly positively cor-
related demand (d1 ¼ d2), independent demand, and
perfectly negatively correlated demand (d1 ¼ 1 d2).
We complement this analytic treatment with a simula-
tion of intermediate cases. Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are
proved in Appendix S1.
2.1.1. Perfectly Correlated Demand.
PROPOSITION 1. All pure strategy equilibria of the game
are in the set ðqe1; qe2Þ ¼ fqe1; qe2 : qA  qe1 ¼ qe2  qBg,
where qA ¼ q  DA and qB ¼ q þ DB with DA ¼
ðcdÞðpcÞc
pðð1þdÞpþðcdÞcÞ [ 0 and DB ¼ ðcdÞðpcÞcpðð1þcÞpðcdÞcÞ [ 0. All
ðqe1; qe2Þ are pure strategy equilibria.
Proposition 1 entails several implications worth
mentioning. The left-hand panel of Figure 1 (labeled
“Demand Correlation: +1”) highlights these implica-
tions by plotting the players’ best response functions,
and thus the game’s equilibria, for the case of a high
margin good (p = 6 and c = 1) and that of a low mar-
gin good (p = 1.5 and c = 1).
First, the game has multiple pure equilibria, in all
of which both players order the exact same quantity.
All these equilibria fall in the (convex and closed) set
of possible order quantities, which range from the
minimum quantity qA to the maximum quantity qB. It
is interesting that, as long as qA  qi  qB, a focal
player i exhibits herding behavior in that she prefers
an order quantity close to the other player i over the
profit maximizing order quantity q. Second, from the
expressions for qA and qB it follows that the herding
range is increasing in the importance of social com-
parison relative to profit maximization (because the
region increases in c and decreases in d and therefore
increases in the difference c  d). Note that the maxi-
mum distance qB  qA ¼ 1  0 ¼ 1 is obtained as
c  d ? ∞. Third, since dqAdp [ 0 and dqBdp \ 0, the size
of the herding region is less for a high margin than for
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a low margin good. Finally, a non-social newsven-
dor’s order quantity q, which maximizes expected
newsvendor profit, is always in this range.
The results are intuitively appealing. When
negative comparison is a factor in decision making, a
purchaser seeks to limit potential social regret and
thus does not want to deviate from the social norm
unless it comes at a severe loss of profits. Consider,
for example, the case where potential negative com-
parison is the sole criterion used when placing orders
(i.e., c ? ∞). Then a purchaser has no incentive to
diverge from her peer’s decision and will match that
decision regardless of what it may be. For the more
common case in which non-social newsvendor profit
is also of importance, this tendency to comply is
bounded by qA and qB. To see why these bounds exist,
consider two players who decrease their ordering
quantities synchronously starting from the optimal
ordering quantity q. As they do so, the loss of
expected profit—and hence the benefit of deviating
from the other player’s ordering quantity—increases.
Eventually there is a cutoff and deviation becomes the
optimal choice. Observe in this regard that in the left-
hand panel of Figure 1, as player 2 orders further
below (above) qA (qB), the best response of player 1
moves in the opposite direction. Because the herding
region is increasing in c  d, stronger social compari-
sons allow for larger deviations from the profit maxi-
mizing solution q. Finally, deviating from the
optimal ordering quantity has more severe implica-
tions for a high margin good than for a low margin
good. Therefore, it becomes rational to abandon herd-
ing earlier for a high margin than for a low margin
good.
In sum, companies that emphasize negative com-
parison (by e.g., instilling a culture of fear) may
induce detrimental behavior in their purchasers. It is
interesting that this behavior may be especially severe
for companies with low margins to start with.
2.1.2. Independent Demand.
PROPOSITION 2. All pure strategy equilibria of the game are
in the set ðq^e1; q^e2Þ ¼ fq^e1; q^e2 : qC  q^e1 ¼ q^e2  qDg, where
qC ¼ q  DC [ qA and qD ¼ q  DD\ qB with
Proposition 2 mirrors Proposition 1 and establishes,
for the case of independent demand, that there exists a
herding region: negative comparison incentivizes pur-
chasers to herd together in order to reduce potential
social regret (see the middle panel in Figure 1, labeled
“Demand Correlation: 0”). The region is a subset of the
herding region for perfectly correlated demand,
½qC; qD  ½qA; qB. Again the herding region is increas-
ing in the importance of social comparison (c  d),
and again it is smaller for the low margin than for the
high margin good; hence higher margin goods are less
prone than are lower margin goods to profit deforma-
tions by social comparison. Thus, the main insights of
the perfectly correlated demand case apply.
Figure 1 Best Response Functions and Equilibria for Social Regret with c = 0.9 and d = 0.1; Solid Lines Represent the Best Response for Player 1,
Dashed Lines for Player 2; Black Lines Illustrate the Case of a High Margin Good with p = 6 and c = 1, Gray Lines that of a Low Margin
Good with p = 1.5 and c = 1
DD ¼
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðc dÞð2þ dþ cÞc2 þ 2ðc dÞð2þ dþ cÞpcþ ð1þ dÞ2p2
q
 ð1þ dÞp2  ðc dÞð2p cÞc
ðc dÞð2p cÞp [ 0
and DC ¼
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðc dÞc2ð2þ dþ cÞ þ ð1þ dÞ2p2
q
 ðc dÞc2  ð1þ dÞp2
ðc dÞpc [ 0. All ðq^
e
1; q^
e
2Þ are pure strategy equilibria.
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However, with respect to the case of perfectly corre-
lated demand, two key differentiating effects emerge
in the case of independent demand. First, the range of
potential equilibria is narrower. It is intuitive that the
possibility of different demand realizations implies
that even matching the other player’s quantity could
entail a negative utility contribution in the regret com-
ponent. Suppose the first player orders a high quan-
tity that is likely to be much greater than realized
demand. Then, the second player’s order of the same
quantity no longer constitutes a perfect hedge,
because now there exist demand realizations such
that the first player faces high demand but the second
player does not. So after matching the first player’s
order quantity, the second player makes a lower
profit than the first and thus experiences regret. Simi-
larly, matching an extremely low order quantity does
not form a perfect hedge, either. Thus, mimicking the
first player’s behavior becomes less attractive.
The second difference is that, compared with the
case of perfectly correlated demand, the herding
region under independent demand is shifted lower2
to the extent that the profit maximizing quantity is
beyond the herding region, q [ qD. In order to
develop some intuition for this effect, we restrict our
attention to cases in which each player orders the
same quantity. It is interesting that only by ordering
qi ¼ qi ¼ 0 do the players experience zero expected
regret—in contrast to the perfectly correlated demand
case, where ordering the same order quantity always
yields zero expected regret. As the common order
quantities increase, the magnitude of expected regret
also increases for each player; thus, the higher the
order quantity, the higher the magnitude of expected
regret. Therefore, players who want to avoid expected
regret must order low quantities which shifts the
herding region downward.
2.1.3. Perfectly Negatively Correlated Demand.
PROPOSITION 3. (i) If p\ ð2þcþdÞc1þd then all the game’s pure
strategy equilibria are in ðqe1; qe2Þ ¼ fqe1; qe2 : qE  qe1 ¼
qe2  qFg, where qE ¼ q  DE and qF ¼ q  DF with
DE¼ ðcdÞðpcÞcpðð1þdÞpþðcdÞcÞ[ 0 and DF¼ ðcdÞðpcÞ
2
pðð1þdÞpþðcdÞð2pcÞÞ[0.
All ðqe1;qe2Þ are pure strategy equilibria.
(ii) If p ð2þcþdÞc1þd then there is exactly one pure strategy
equilibrium ðqe1;qe2Þ, where qe1 ¼ qe2 ¼ q  DG with
DG ¼ ðcdÞc2ð1þdÞp [ 0.
Proposition 3 establishes the validity of all our pre-
vious results for perfectly negatively correlated
demand; negative comparison incentivizes purchas-
ers to herd together; the higher the aversion to social
regret, the wider the range in which purchasers try to
match each other; higher margin goods are less prone
to profit deformations than are lower margin goods.
As compared with the other two cases, the herding
region becomes even smaller and shifts further down-
ward. However, as illustrated by the best response
functions in the right-hand panel in Figure 1 (labeled
“Demand Correlation: 1”), the case of perfectly neg-
atively correlated demand requires elaboration.
Proposition 3 establishes two distinct regimes. For
low margin goods, there is again a convex and closed
herding region. For combinations of low social regret
and high margins, however, the herding region may
collapse to a single point. This single equilibrium
point implies common ordering quantities lower than
the optimal ordering quantity q. We therefore view
the collapse as a special case of profit-deforming
herding.
2.1.4. General Demand Correlation. Generalizing
the correlation structure for demand d1 and d2
requires that we make additional assumptions about
their joint distribution function. For perfectly posi-
tively correlated demand, independent demand, and
perfectly negatively correlated demand, our assump-
tion of a uniform marginal distribution fully speci-
fies the joint distribution of d1 and d2. In contrast,
for ρ 62 {1,0,1} we must define the joint distribu-
tion function explicitly. For the sake of model consis-
tency we maintain the assumption of uniform
marginal distributions for d1 and d2 and thus resort
to copula statistics. A copula is a joint partial distri-
bution function whose marginal partial distribution
functions are uniform on the unit interval. Several
families of copulas have been characterized, such as
the Archimedan, the periodic, and the Gaussian
opula. We base our analysis on the Gaussian copula,
since it has become popular in applied research
(Li 2000). Its probability distribution function
(pdf) is defined as cðx; yÞ ¼ /BðU1ðxÞ;U1ðyÞ;qÞð/ðU1ðxÞÞ/ðU1ðyÞÞ, where
/Bðu; v; qÞ ¼ 1
2p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1q2
p e12ð1q2Þ ½u2þv22uv, / the pdf of
the standard normal distribution, Φ the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal
distribution, and ρ the correlation coefficient.
From the pdf of the Gaussian copula it is immedi-
ately apparent that our model cannot be treated
analytically for general demand correlation. (Neither
could it be for any of the other families of copulas that
allow for arbitrary correlation structures.) We there-
fore turn to a numerical treatment. Figure 2 shows the
equilibria for correlations between ρ = 1 and ρ = 1.
Following the insights from our analytical section, we
show examples for both a high margin and a low
margin case. In addition to the numerical results, the
figure also plots the theoretical predictions from our
closed-form analysis.
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First, as a matter of internal consistency, we find
that the numerical and the analytical results coincide
(what small deviations remain can be attributed to the
unavoidable rasterization of the simulated best
response functions). Second, and more importantly,
the graphs for arbitrary demands reinforce our
findings from the analytical sections. In particular:
negative comparison induces herding; herding is pro-
nounced in the importance of social comparison;
higher margin goods are less affected by herding
behavior than are lower margin goods; decreasing
demand correlation reduces the width of the herding
region (for negative correlation and low margin goods
possibly to a single point) and the center of the herd-
ing region moves lower as demand correlation
decreases. Third, as an additional point, the width of
the herding region changes very gradually with
changes in correlation, except there is a marked shift
in the width of the herding region for a change in
correlation from +1 to +0.95. Given these results,
avoiding a setup in which purchasers face perfect
positive demand correlation is one way to mitigate
the negative effects of social regret.
2.2. Social Rejoice Case
For d > c, the social rejoice component plays a larger
role in decision making than the social regret compo-
nent. We call this case the social rejoice case. Once
again we begin by considering analytically the cases of
perfectly positively correlated demand, independent
demand and perfectly negatively correlated demand
and then treat numerically the intermediate cases.
Proposition 4, 5, and 6 are proved in Appendix S2.
2.2.1. Perfectly Correlated Demand.
PROPOSITION 4. There are exactly two pure strategy
equilibria of the game: ðqe;11 ; qe;12 Þ and ðqe;21 qe;22 Þ,
where qe;11 ¼ qe;22 ¼ q þ DH and qe;21 ¼ qe;12 ¼ q  DJ
with DH ¼ ðpcÞcðdcÞðð1þcÞpþðdcÞcÞð1þdÞpð2c2ðdcÞþ2pcðdcÞþð1þcÞp2Þ [ 0 and DJ ¼
ðpcÞcðdcÞðð1þdÞpðdcÞcÞ
ð1þdÞpð2c2ðdcÞþ2pcðdcÞþð1þcÞp2Þ [ 0.
Proposition 4 has three main implications, which
are illustrated by the two players’ best response func-
tions as depicted in the left-hand panel of Figure 3
(labeled “Demand Correlation: +1”). First, there are
exactly two pure strategy equilibria. These equilibria
are asymmetric in the sense that both players always
order different quantities: one player orders more and
the other player less than the non-social newsvendor
optimum q. Yet, they are also symmetric in the sense
that both equilibria consist of the same set of order
quantities; they differ only in whether player 1 or
player 2 orders the higher or lower quantity, respec-
tively. Second, the difference between these two
quantities is increasing in the importance of social
rejoice, d  c. Finally, this difference is higher for a
low margin good than for a high margin good.
Social rejoice makes an interesting contrast to social
regret. Social rejoice induces players to differentiate
themselves from each other. Thus it results in polari-
zation, the opposite of herding. Purchasers engage in
risky behavior to be “ahead of the pack” should
extreme demand be realized and they disregard the
loss that such behavior yields in the (more likely) case
of normal demand. However, social rejoice does share
some characteristics with social regret. Organizational
mechanisms that encourage social rejoice also induce
detrimental behavior; this behavior is more promi-
nent if the social rejoice component is emphasized
and if margins are higher (since a deviation from the
optimal order quantity entails more lost profit in
expectation).
2.2.2. Independent Demand.
PROPOSITION 5. There are exactly two pure strategy
equilibria of the game, ðq^e;11 ; q^e;12 Þ and ðq^e;21 ; q^e;22 Þ, where
q\ q^e;21 ¼ q^e;12 \ q^e;11 ¼ q^e;22 :
Proposition 5 exhibits the same key characteristics
as Proposition 4 for perfectly correlated demand, as
shown by the best response functions in the middle
panel of Figure 3 (labeled “Demand Correlation: 0”).
Figure 2 Herding Equilibria for Social Regret with c = 0.9 and d = 0.1; the Light Gray Region Illustrates the Equilibria for a High Margin Good with
p = 6 and c = 1, the Dark Gray Region for a Low Margin Good with p = 1.5 and c = 1; Demand Correlation Is Simulated from 1 to 1 in
Steps of 0.05; the Dots are Predictions from the Closed-Form Analysis
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That being said, two aspects of the independent
demand scenario are worthy of additional comment.
First, under perfectly correlated demand, purchasers
can experience social rejoice in expectation only by
differentiating their order quantities. Yet under inde-
pendent demand the independent realizations them-
selves create the opportunity for profit differentiation,
so purchasers feel less need for quantity differentia-
tion. As a consequence, they polarize less. Second, the
magnitude of profit differentiation provided by
demand differences is higher, the less that demand is
censored by order quantities. Thus, on average the
players’ order quantities are driven upward in this
case.
2.2.3. Perfectly Negatively Correlated Demand.
PROPOSITION 6. (i) If p(1 + d) < (2 + d + c)c then there
are exactly two pure strategy equilibria of the game, ðqe;11 ;qe;12 Þ
and ðqe;21 ;qe;22 Þ, where qe;11 ¼qe;22 ¼qþDK and qe;12 ¼qe;21 ¼
qþDM with DK¼ ð1þcÞðdcÞðpcÞcð1þdÞðð1þcÞp2ðdcÞðpcÞ2Þð1þcÞðdcÞc2[0
andDM¼ ð1þdÞðdcÞðpcÞ
2
ð1þdÞðð1þcÞp2ðdcÞðpcÞ2Þð1þcÞðdcÞc2[0.
(ii) If p(1 + d)  (2 + d + c)c then there is exactly one pure
strategy equilibrium of the game ðqe1;qe2Þ, where
qe1¼qe2¼qþDN withDN¼ ðdcÞc2pð1þdÞ[0.
The result for perfectly negatively correlated
demand replicates the main results of the other cases
(for an illustration see the right-hand panel of Figure
3, labeled “Demand Correlation: 1”): social rejoice
leads to polarization that is amplified in the impor-
tance of the social rejoice contribution (d  c) and that
increases for low margin goods. In addition, the main
trends persist: perfectly negative demand correlation
brings about profit differentiation even without polar-
ization, so the need for polarization is decreased even
further as compared with perfectly positively corre-
lated demand or independent demand. Moreover,
there is a continued trend to increase ordering quanti-
ties, since high demand realizations for a focal player
are guaranteed to coincide with low realizations for
the other player.
One aspect does require discussion. For low margin
goods, social rejoice induces polarization as before.
For high margin goods, however, the two polarized
equilibria may collapse into a single point. Both play-
ers order the same quantity, which is greater than the
newsvendor optimum. Much as with the case of herd-
ing, we view the collapse as a special case of rejoice
since the equilibrium quantity still implies profit dis-
tortion.
2.2.4. General Demand Correlation. Figure 4
shows the results of the numerically calculated equi-
libria of the social rejoice case for correlations between
ρ = 1 and ρ = 1. We display two exemplary cases
that address the two mathematical subcases of Propo-
sition 6. The graphs also plot the analytical predic-
tions from our closed-form analysis. Analytic results
and simulation results match nearly perfectly, thus
establishing the soundness of our simulations. As was
the case for social regret, the simulation reinforces the
findings from the analytical sections.
2.3. Extending the Model to Inequity Aversion
In the 1960s and 1970s, social psychologists began for-
mally researching the common desire to establish
equitable societies (Walster et al. 1973). Experiments
have since demonstrated that human beings may
derive utility from equity of outcomes relative to a
peer group (e.g., Dawes et al. 2007). Recent results
from neuronal analysis suggest that human beings
are in fact hard-wired to react to inequity (Triconi
et al. 2010). Hence motives of equality must be viewed
as natural and universal in human beings.
Figure 3 Best Response Functions and Equilibria for Social Rejoice with c = 0.1 and d = 0.9; Solid Lines Represent the Best Response for Player
1, Dashed Lines for Player 2; Black Lines Illustrate a High Margin Good Case with p = 6 and c = 1, Gray Lines a Low Margin Good Case
with p = 1.5 and c = 1
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The supply chain literature has begun to con-
sider such equality motives. Cui et al. (2007) and
Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010) look at supply chain
coordination and find that fairness considerations—
concerning the distribution of profits between a
manufacturer and a retailer—may allow for simpler
coordinating contracts as compared to the standard
case. Katok et al. (2011) explore the implications
for supply chain efficiency of the two partners not
being informed about their respective fairness pref-
erences.
Since in this study we are concerned with the influ-
ence of organizational forces on purchasing decisions,
we have to consider equality. Egalitarian motives (and
the closely related motives of justice) have spawned
many different detail conceptualizations. There are
conceptualizations that define equality and justice
over intentions (Fehr and Schmidt 2006, Rabin 1993).
What a decision maker intends is the basis for judging
the justice of actions. While this is a useful conceptual-
ization in everyday life, in the context of (organiza-
tional) incentives it is preferable to define equality
over outcomes: In a business setting, such as ours, out-
comes tend to play a more important role in motivat-
ing individuals than do intentions.
The concrete conceptualization that is immediately
relevant to our model is inequity aversion (Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Inequity
aversion postulates that any deviation from equality
gives a negative contribution to utility. As a result,
both a positive and a negative deviation from a group
norm is viewed as undesirable. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) introduce a social utility function that—using
our notation—defines inequity aversion as
Uiðqi; qi; di; diÞ ¼ piðqi; diÞ  a½piðqi; diÞ
 piðqi; diÞþ  b½piðqi; diÞ
 piðqi; diÞþ
ð2Þ
with inequity parameters a,b > 0. For purely techni-
cal reasons we assume that b < 1. Then,
LEMMA 1. In our games, there is a choice of social regret
parameters c and d such that for any choice of a and b,
there is an equivalent formulation of the best response
functions for inequity aversion and social regret. Equiva-
lence can always be attained for ðcdÞð1þdÞ ¼ ðaþbÞð1bÞ.
The technical formulation of Lemma 1 masks a sim-
ple insight. Although the utility functions for social
regret and inequity aversion are technically different,
they induce structurally the same equilibria for our
games. Specifically, for ðcdÞð1þdÞ ¼ ðaþbÞð1bÞ they imply the
exact same equilibria. Hence, as a consequence of
Lemma 1, we can immediately apply our equilibria
results for the social regret case to the inequity aver-
sion case by replacing the term ðcdÞð1þdÞ in the equilibria
solutions of social regret by ðaþbÞð1bÞ. Lemma 1 ensures
that this is possible.
Lemma 1 then allows for a few simple conclusions.
As was the case for social regret, (i) inequity aversion
inadvertently induces herding behavior, (ii) as
demand correlation increases the herding region ulti-
mately increases as well, (iii) higher margin goods are
less prone to profit deformations than are lower mar-
gin goods. However, it is also informative to focus on
the differences between inequity aversion and social
regret. Herding behavior is more pronounced for
inequity aversion than for social regret: for social
regret the herding region only increases in one
parameter (as ðcdÞð1þdÞ only increases in c), while for ineq-
uity aversion the region increases in both (as ðaþbÞð1bÞ
increases in both a and b). Moreover, when setting
a = c and b = d the herding region is wider for ineq-
uity aversion than for social regret since ðaþbÞð1bÞ [
ðcdÞ
ð1þdÞ.
In sum, Lemma 1 implies that in our games, inequity
aversion induces the players to behave as if it was an
extreme form of social regret.
The technical reason for the similarity of the two
concepts lies in the utility functions: Mathemati-
cally using ½piðqi; diÞ  piðqi; diÞþ ¼ ½piðqi; diÞ
piðqi; diÞþ þ piðqi; diÞ  piðqi; diÞ the utility for
Figure 4 Equilibria for Social Rejoice with c = 0.1 and d = 0.9; Black Lines Represent the x and y Coordinates of the Equilibria of a High Margin
Good with p = 6 and c = 1, the Gray Lines those of a Low Margin Good with p = 1.5 and c = 1; Simulation for Demand Correlation from
1 to 1 in Steps of 0.05; the Dots Are Predictions from the Closed-Form Analysis
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social regret can be written asUiðqi;qi;di;diÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞ
piðqi;diÞdpiðqi;diÞðcdÞ½piðqi;diÞpiðqi;diÞþ
and for inequity aversion as Uiðqi;qi;di;diÞ¼
ð1 bÞpiðqi;diÞþ bpiðqi;diÞðaþ bÞ½piðqi;diÞ pi
ðqi;diÞþ. When a player optimizes E½Ui (E½ Ui) so as to
derive her best response function, she can neglect the
term dE½pi (bE½pi) because it does not depend on
qi. So in both equations the second term on the right-
hand side can be dropped. But then both equations
are structurally equivalent. This structural equivalence
explains the similarities in the effects that the two con-
cepts bring about. Comparing the two equations, the
coefficient in front of the newsvendor profit is smaller
for inequity aversion while the coefficient in front of
the last term is larger. This shift in emphasis explains
the increased size of the herding region for inequity
aversion.
The similarity of the two concepts is in fact intui-
tive. In the case of social regret, the manager feels joy
when outperforming others. However, the fear of
being outperformed is stronger and hence herding
results. In contrast, in the case of inequity aversion,
the manager does not feel joy when outperforming
others but rather fears both outperforming and being
outperformed. Since it is this dominant fear that
drives herding behavior, both concepts imply herd-
ing. However, there are more outcomes to be fearful
of for inequity aversion than for social regret and
hence herding behavior is pronounced.
3. Discussion
Purchasers rarely operate in isolation. Rather, they
are typically part of an organizational structure or
social system. This study considers a social compari-
son context in which two basic situations arise.
A purchaser feels social regret, a negative contribution
to utility, if she is inferior to a peer or feels social
rejoice, a positive contribution to utility, if she is
superior. Our analysis suggests that social regret
induces herding behavior among purchasers. In
order to avoid feeling discomfort about coming up
short in a social comparison, purchasers faced with
uncertainty converge to a common ordering deci-
sion. Social rejoice, in contrast, induces polarization
among purchasers. In order to create the opportunity
for being superior in a social comparison, purchasers
seek to occupy their own niche. Interestingly, ineq-
uity aversion, in which purchasers feel discomfort
about both being superior and inferior has the same
effects as a strong case of social regret. In all situa-
tions, purchasers are willing to sacrifice some
expected profit in order to further their social and
organizational aims. Social comparison usually
induces behavior that does not yield profit maximi-
zation for the firm.
Organizations tend, informally or formally, to rein-
force social comparison through their incentive and
management systems. Examples include informal
praise or critique and the resulting change of status.
More formal means include bonus payments for
above-average performance and improved chances
of career progression. However, mechanisms that
encourage social comparison may also cause detri-
mental behavior. An outside observer might easily
construe such behavior as part of the company cul-
ture: “This is how things are done around here!” Yet
because the behavior is based on purchasers’ utility
functions, it is time invariant and persists in the orga-
nization. For this reason, attempts to change the situa-
tion that are based mainly on process improvement
and do not take the phenomenon’s organizational
roots into account, are likely to be ineffectual. This
means that realizing how social regret (or inequity
aversion) and social rejoice distort optimal decision
making has implications for how firms should man-
age purchasing organizations.
So why, then, do companies (and not just multilevel
marketing companies) make such prominent use of
social comparison? As in any newsvendor model that
we are aware of, in our model the decision maker
does not have to exert effort. Hence our model (as do
the others) clearly abstracts from an important
organizational reality. Of course, motivating person-
nel to work hard is a substantial management prob-
lem. Purchasing requires analytical effort, especially
since purchasers have responsibilities beyond setting
order quantities such as finding suppliers and evalu-
ating their competence. Some purchasers may be
unwilling to expend effort without encouragement.
Using social comparison is typically viewed as an
appropriate method for inducing such effort. A man-
ager of a live organization needs to balance these
known motivational effects of social comparison with
its downside, the distorting behavior highlighted by
our model.
For managers who consider using social compari-
son, our model yields some practical insights on when
and how to use social regret (or inequity aversion)
and social rejoice most efficiently. First, for high levels
of positive demand correlation, the herding region
contains the optimal order quantity. As correlation
declines, the herding region is pushed increasingly
lower and so eventually excludes the newsvendor
optimum. Note also that the herding region is largest
when demand is perfectly positively correlated.
Hence, whenever managers employ social regret (or
inequity aversion), they should try to distribute pur-
chasing tasks in such a way that outcomes show posi-
tive correlation just shy of perfect correlation;
managers should then employ secondary mecha-
nisms to steer decision making as close as possible to
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the actual optimum. Similarly, whenever managers
try to use social rejoice as a motivational tool, they
should avoid high levels of demand correlation and
prefer moderate levels of positive correlation in order
to minimize the negative effects of polarization.
Our second practical insight is that social regret (or
inequity aversion) induces (or, at least, allows for)
larger deviations from the optimal order quantity for
low margin goods than for high margin goods. Mar-
gins have a more nuanced effect in the case of social
rejoice, but low margin goods generally induce more
polarization than do high margin goods. Therefore
organizations that focus on high margin goods can
cope with the negative effects of social comparison
better than organizations that focus on low margin
goods. In such high margin companies, the positive
motivational effect outweighs the negative effect of
more easily distorted decisions, so using social com-
parison becomes more appropriate.
Finally, social effects hinge on the observability of
those aspects that are being compared. The perfor-
mance of the comparison group must therefore be
transparent. This requirement has two implications.
On the one hand, a lack of transparency curtails the
tendency to compare; hence it can be used as a mecha-
nism to reduce unwanted social comparison in situa-
tions where it arises naturally. On the other hand, if
management wants to harness the power of social
comparison, then transparency is indispensable.
Obviously, our model has limitations that need to
be considered when interpreting the results. First of
all, in order to not let technical detail obscure the
interpretation of results, we limited mathematical
complexity. We analyze two-player games and we
assume linear regret and rejoice as well as a uniform
demand distribution. We would expect the results to
mirror ours for non-linear regret and non-uniform
distributions—although closed form expression may
not be possible. Increasing the number of players in
the game, however, may yield additional insights
because more complex behavioral patterns may
become desirable. Second, our results are based on
mathematical modeling. Therefore, they build strong
hypotheses as to which behaviors to expect in situa-
tions of social comparison. However, the practical
relevance of our predictions can only be verified
through experiments and ultimately through an
empirical analysis. In future studies, we plan to
understand the effects of social comparison better
through lab experiments, not only to verify our model
but also to advance it.
In this study, we have used a parsimonious
model to take some initial steps toward under-
standing the influence of the social context on pur-
chasing behavior as well as the distorting effects of
that influence. We have thus begun to address the
imbalance between actual purchasing managers’
strong focus on organizational issues and the
dearth of reflection on such issues in operations
management research.
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Notes
1An intriguing example of this mechanism is the “postal
code” lottery conducted in the Netherlands (Zeelenberg
and Pieters 2004), where each lottery ticket is linked to the
owner’s postal code. Thus, an individual who decides not
to buy the ticket faces the prospect of strong future regret
if his postal code is selected, for then all his ticket-buying
neighbors will have won while he is left out.
2More precisely, the middle point of the herding region is
shifted downward.
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